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ARTICLE
THE ROLE OF CONCILIATION IN THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM
Lynn Berat*
Above all else, esteem concord; make it your first duty to avoid
discord."
INTRODUCTION
The modern Japanese legal system remains rooted in traditional val-
ues in which conciliation, rather than adjudication, is the preferred
method of dispute resolution. Despite heavy Western influence begin-
ning in the 1850s and peaking during the post-World War II occupa-
tion, the Japanese legal system emphasizes harmony rather than con-
flict. Even the Japanese Supreme Court, the Saikosai, is reluctant to
cause discord and rarely uses its constitutionally authorized power of
judicial review.
This article examines the legal and historical factors that have con-
tributed to the Japanese preference for conciliation rather than adjudi-
cation. It explores conciliation methods and theories, and the changes
that the power of judicial review has wrought throughout the Japanese
courts. The first section examines Japan's history prior to 1600. Section
two traces the development of the Japanese preference for conciliation
during the Tokugawa or feudal era. The third section discusses the
Western impact upon the Japanese judiciary prior to World War II
and the Western role in establishing an independent judiciary following
World War II. Finally, the fourth section assesses the Japanese judici-
ary's exercise of judicial review and the current use of conciliation in
the legal system.
* Lecturer, Yale Law School; Ph.D., Yale Law School; J.D., University of Texas.
1. CONST. IN SEVENTEEN ARTICLES (604 A.D.), art. 1, reprinted in CASE & Co.t.,
July-Aug., 1953, at 20.
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I. EARLY SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUES
A. THE FIRST SEVEN CENTURIES
The Japanese preference for conciliation and consensus is rooted in
ideologies originating in the fifth century A.D. At that time, Japan was
again exposed to Chinese culture after almost 100 years of isolation,
and most importantly, to the influences of Confucianism and Bud-
dhism.2 Confucian and Buddhist values gained great popularity and, in
604 A.D., Prince Shotoku promulgated the Constitution in Seventeen
Articles based on Buddhist mores.' The Seventeen Articles, the first
known national codification of legal principles,4  declared that
"[c]oncord is to be honored, and discord to be averted." 5
In 646 A.D., during the Taiko era, the Japanese government began a
major reform and implemented state planning by nationalizing the
kingdom and redistributing state rice plantations.' In addition, the gov-
ernment instituted the Chinese, Confucian-based class structure of
ritsu-ryo, in which each class was required to perform a specific func-
tion within a rigid social structure.7 The ritsu-ryo emphasized morality,
encouraged people's good behavior, and punished them for wrongdo-
ing.8 However, the ritsu-ryo did not confer legal rights and duties upon
2. See JAMES MURDOCH, 1 A HISTORY OF JAPAN 53 (1964) [hereinafter MUR-
DOCH] (discussing early China-Japan interactions).
3. CONST. IN SEVENTEEN ARTICLES (604 A.D.), art. 1, reprinted in CASE AND
CoM., July-Aug. 1953, at 20.
4. Id. art. I.
5. Id. art. 1.
6. See MURDOCH, supra note 2, at 142-80 (discussing the Japanese reform effort of
646 A.D.); GEORGE SANSOM, A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, 56-60 (1958) [hereinafter
A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334] (discussing the early stages of the Japanese reform
movement of 646 A.D.).
7. A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, supra note 6, at 111 (describing the ritsu-ryo
codes). The codes consisted of the ryo, which is the administrative and civil code. Id.
The administrative code designated the titles, structure, and duties of all organs of the
state. Id. The civil code regulated the duties, obligations, and privileges of all subjects
of the state, from the nobility to the slaves. Id. The civil code outlined the conduct of
traditional ceremonies, such as marriage, funerals, and religious celebrations. Id. The
ritsu provided disciplinary regulations which defined the acceptable conduct of individ-
uals. Id. See also GEORGE SANSOM, JAPAN: A SHORT CULTURAL HISTORY 156 (1932)
[hereinafter JAPAN: A SHORT CULTURAL HISTORY] (stating that the Japanese reforms
of 646 A.D. were modeled after the Sui and T'ang codes in China). The T'ang dynasty
emerged in China during the sixth century, and developed into one of the most sophisti-
cated and powerful governments in the world at that time. EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER,
JAPAN: PAST AND PRESENT 17-23 (1954) [hereinafter REISCHAUER]. Impressed with
the successes of the T'ang centralized form of government, the Japanese sought to
model their own government after that of the T'ang. Id. at 22-23.
8. See A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, supra note 6, at 111 (stating that the ritsu
provided prohibitive and disciplinary regulations).
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the populace.' In the government's view, the ritsu-ryo operated only to
educate people in Confucian values.' 0
B. THE RnTsu-Ryo SYSTEM
From the sixth century to the twelvth century A.D., the Japanese
promulgated several ritsu-ryo codes based on the Chinese Tang Dy-
nasty's codes."' Ritsu-ryo functioned poorly in Japan, however, and a
new system of appropriating public offices and lands developed in the
ninth and tenth centuries.12 Individuals acquired estates through pa-
tronage and usurpation, and through the domination of citizens who
submitted themselves to the authority and will of the strong.13 These
estates, known as shoen, became popular and eventually acquired an
official character when the Japanese emperors granted the land owners
a variety of legal immunities.'
9. See A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, supra note 6, at 70-74 (explaining the Chi-
nese T'ang code upon which the Japanese based their ritsu-ryo codes). Fifth and sixth
century Asian culture cared little about individual rights. Id. at 72. The Chinese Tang
code did not go far in defining the duties or rights of individuals. Id. at 71-72. It was
believed that an individual's behavior could not be measured by "human law," but
rather, only by the extent a person's offense caused a disturbance with "nature." Id. at
71.
10. See A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, supra note 6, at 70-74 (discussing Con-
fucian and Buddhist influence on the development of Japanese law in the seventh
century).
11. See A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, supra note 6, at 67-74 (discussing the his-
tory and advancements of the T'ang Dynasty in China).
12. See A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, supra note 6, at 111 (noting that the ritsu-
ryo encountered difficulty in adapting to the demands of a rapidly developing Japanese
society). See also Oyama Kyohei, Medieval Shoen, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
JAPAN 89 (K. Yamamura ed., 1990) (describing the shoen system through which prop-
erty and rights, once held only by the government, were transferred to private individu-
als). During what is known as the Nara period, which lasted from 710 to 794 A.D., the
state controlled all land in the Japanese provinces. Id. at 89. From 794 to 1185 A.D.,
the Heian period, however, the provinces developed systems whereby individuals ac-
quired private holdings of property known as shoen. Id. at 89.
13. See R.H.P. MASON & J.G. CAIGER, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 5355 (1972) [here-
inafter MASON & CAIGER] (describing the development of the shoen system). Because
no monetary system then existed in Japan, state officials and members of the aristoc-
racy received compensation in the form of land. Id. at 53. Also, peasants often gave up
the rights in their land to a local ruling body in exchange for guarantees of security
and the continuing right to harvest the land. Id. at 54. This system of exchange is often
referred to as "commendation." Id. See also, Dan F. Henderson, Some Aspects of
Tokugawa Law, 27 WASH. L. REv. 85, 89 (1952) [hereinafter Aspects of Tokugawa
Law] (discussing three phases of the Japanese feudal period).
14. See id. at 54-55 (stating that while some shoen only retained a tax immunity,
many eventually became totally exempt from any control or authority of the
government).
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In addition to the development of private estates, a powerful military
class emerged. 5 Under the ritsu-ryo system, the government attempted
to create an army, but soldiers chose to evade service rather than sup-
ply their own provisions, weapons, and other necessities as required.",
As a result, at the end of the eighth century, this army was replaced
with one led by the powerful provincial clans that formed a new social
class known as the samurai.'7 The samurai lived according to their
own personal customary law, based on chivalry and a vassal's duty to
the overlord. 8 In return, the lord would often grant the vassal a piece
of land, or the right to collect rent or taxes from the land.' 9 As reliance
upon the local samurai grew, so did their power and willingness to
openly defy the central government.20
C. THE MILITARY GOVERMENT
Toward the end of the twelvth century, Japan suffered through a
series of civil wars and subsequently emerged as a feudal state con-
trolled by a military leader, known as the shogun.21 During the Kama-
15. See A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, supra note 6, at 103-07 (discussing the
difficulties of eigth and ninth century Japan in implementing a system of universal
military service). By emulating many Chinese values and practices, Japan also ab-
sorbed the Buddhist aversion to violence. Id. at 104. In 701 A.D., for example, private
persons were prohibited from possessing weapons. Id. However, as small settlements
came under frequent attack by neighboring clans, the need for security grew increas-
ingly important. Id. In time, a class of private warriors emerged to provide the needed
protection. Id. at 105.
16. See A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, supra note 6, at 104 (explaining that peas-
ants evaded military service by running away, and the wealthy exempted themselves
through reliance on their privileged status).
17. MIKIsO HANE, JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY, 68-71 (1972) [hereinafter
HANE] (discussing the rise of the samurai class). The Japanese abandoned the system
of universal military recruitment in 792 A.D. Id. at 68. As the central government's
ability to protect the provinces declined, local governors increasingly relied upon local
chieftains and shoen proprietors for security. Id.
18. Id. at 69.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 73-76 (discussing the conflict between the Taira and Minamoto
clans). In the eleventh century, two military families rose to power, the Taira and the
Minamoto. Id. at 73. From 1156 to 1159, these two families engaged in a struggle for
power in the imperial court. Id. In 1159, the Minamoto family was defeated and
Yoritomo, a member of the vanquished family, was banished to a small coastal island.
Id. The ruling Taira family, however, suffered through several natural disasters and
uprisings. Id. at 74-75. In 1180, Yoritomo returned from exile, and five years later,
defeated the Taira family. Id. at 74. Yorimoto became shogun of the imperial court in
1192. MASON & CAIGER, supra note 13, at 103. His rule marked the beginning of
almost seven centuries during which the military class dominated Japan. HANE, supra
note 17, at 76.
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kura period, which lasted from 1185 to 1333,22 largely autonomous es-
tate owners settled their disputes with shogunate representatives
through conciliation. 3 In the 1300s, a period of internal strife again
engulfed Japan which lasted 400 hundred years.2' These centuries of
unrest ended with the victory of feudalism, and the 250 year rule of the
Tokugawa family then followed. 20 The Tokugawas feared that the infu-
sion of Western Christian missionaries, who arrived in the 1500s,2"
would result in a Western European conquest of Japan.21 Conse-
quently, the Tokugawas made Confucianism the official religion in Ja-
pan and began a ruthless suppression of Christianity. 28 Also, in a
highly successful effort to isolate Japan from the rest of the world, the
Tokugawas expelled most foreigners.29
II. THE TOKUGAWA, OR FEUDAL, ERA
A. FEUDALISM AND THE TOKUGAWA STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
After the Tokugawas eliminated their opposition, the country settled
into a period of prolonged peace."0 During this period, Japan fostered a
rigid hierarchical social structure in which it was virtually impossible
for individuals to move from one class to another.31 The emperor, as
the theocratic patriarch of the state, occupied the apex of the social
22. JOHN HALL, JAPAN: FROM PREHISTORY TO MODERN TIMES 359 (1970) [herein-
after HALL].
23. See John M. Maki, Conciliation and Compromise in the Law of Military
Houses of the Recent Era, in MEMORIAL TO DOCTOR SAITO ON HIS SIxTIETH ANNI-
VERSARY, LAW AND LITIGATION 206 (1942) [hereinafter Maki] (stating that disputes
between estate owners and the shogunate were resolved through conciliation).
24. RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 536 (3d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter DAVID & BRIERLEY].
25. See Id. (discussing the inegalitarianism existing in the Tokugawa era).
26. See CHARLES BOXER, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY IN JAPAN 1-40 (1967)
(describing the first contacts between Western Europeans and the Japanese); see also
JAPAN: A SHORT CULTURAL HISTORY, supra note 7, at 407-10 (discussing the first
arrival of Jesuit missionaries in the sixteenth century). Francis Xavier, a Spanish Jes-
uit, arrived in the Japanese city of Kagoshima in 1549. Id. at 407. By 1582, 150,000
Japanese had been converted to Christianity. Id. at 410.
27. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 536 (explaining the Tokugawas'
fear that Christianity would destroy the Japanese social order).
28. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 536 (discussing the Tokugawa per-
secution of Christians).
29. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 536 (stating that the Tokugawa
shogunate adopted isolationist policies).
30. HANE, supra note 17, at 151.
31. See CHARLES DUNN, EVERYDAY LIFE IN TRADITIONAL JAPAN 8-9 (1969) (indi-
cating that the Tokugawa shogunate had a rigid class structure). See also REIS-
CHAUER, supra note 7, at 80-87 (stating that the Tokugawa preserved peace through
inflexible social controls and discipline).
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hierarchy, but the shogun, as the military leader, wielded the real
power. 2 Beneath these leaders, the population was divided into seven
strictly separated and immutable classes, descending hierarchically
from court nobles, military nobility (or buke), samurai, farmers, arti-
sans, merchants, and finally, outcasts and beggars. 3
The stratification of Tokugawa Japan led to a legal system that de-
fined relationships between social classes rather than between individu-
als.34 In fact, the legal system was designed to ensure that the popula-
tion respected and adhered to the class structure.3 5 The 30 million
Japanese were subject almost exclusively to the discretion of the mili-
tary nobility, known as the buke, against whom the system offered little
protection .3  A buke member could kill any commoner, artisan, or
merchant who did not exhibit proper deference.37 Moreover, the ability
of a commoner to bring suits against those deemed to be socially "supe-
rior" was prohibited.3 8 Thus, the parameters of permissible behavior
depended more on one's social status, rather than on any rule of law.39
The family provided the basic societal unit for all legal purposes, and
it fully embodied the hierarchical system of inequality.40 Responsibili-
ties of the family, and the rights to all its property passed to the eldest
son upon the father's death.41 The Tokugawa period institutionalized
32. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 92. See Arthur T. Von Mehren,
Some Reflections on Japanese Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1486 (1958) (noting that
the Meiji Restoration reinvigorated the Emperor's political power for the first time in
approximately seven hundred years); see also MASON & CAIGER, supra note 13, at
111-12 (explaining how the shogun overshadowed the imperial family in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries).
33. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 92-93. See DAVID & BRIERLEY,
supra note 24, at 535 (describing the seven social classes).
34. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 535 (explaining that a Japanese
person's entire lifestyle hinged on his class membership). See also HANE, supra note
17, at 162-63 (describing the system of of justice in the Tokugawa period as one of
"rule by status" in which a class of persons was expected to submit themselves to the
will of the class above).
35. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 454 (noting that the legal system
supported the class structure).
36. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 454 (indicating that no thought was
given to the concept of individual rights, particularly as between a member of an infer-
ior class and a member of a superior class).
37. See HALL, supra note 22, at 179 (stating that the samurai, as the recognized
heads of society, charged with maintaining civil order, felt a sense of "duty" to kill a
disrespectful commoner).
38. HANE, supra note 17, at 162-63. Peasants also had no right to appeal the deci-
sions of their local lords. Id. at 164. Those who did appeal, did so at the risk of execu-
tion, regardless of the merits of their case. Id.
39. HANE, supra note 17, at 162.
40. HALL, supra note 22, at 180.
41. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 94-95. See HANE, supra note 17,
at 179-80 (describing the hierarchical family structure).
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inequality through the legal, social, and religious systems. 2 For exam-
ple, women were regarded as a permanent underclass as three powerful
ideologies united against them: within Buddhist philosophy women
were seen as "unclean creatures of temptation;" 43 under feudalism, eve-
rything "effeminate" was shunned; and, in Confucian teachings,
women were instructed to be perpetually obedient to men." Japan's
adultery law further illustrated the inequality. The law did not afford a
remedy to the wife of an unfaithful husband, while the husband was
awarded the power to determine the legal fate of his adulterous wife,
which included the option of execution.4"
The Tokugawa system of government was similarly hierarchically
structured and contained several checks and balances on government
power. First, three men, known as tairo or chief policy advisors, were
hired so that one could watch the others to guard against abuses of
power. 6 Second, to prevent collusion and nepotism, senior councilors,
or roju were appointed to control the heads of the magistracy.4' Third,
the Tokugawa government used censors, known as o-metsuke, to inves-
tigate the conduct of the daimyo, or feudal lords.4 Finally, the shogun
required that all of the dainyo spend alternating periods between the
Tokugawa capital of Edo and their fiefs, while their families stayed as
42. See HANE, supra note 17, at 158-81 (discussing the many ways that social
status and title determined the permissible bounds of individual behavior).
43. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 94. See DIANA PAUL, Wo,IE IN
BUDDHISM 3 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the role of women in Buddhism).
44. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 94. See NOnUSHtIE Hozu,,I.
ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND JAPANESE LAW 125 (1943) [hereinafter HozuNti (explain-
ing the inferior status of women). Women found their roles assigned by a precept
named the "three obediences," in which a woman was to be obedient to her father
while unmarried, her husband while married, and her son when widowed. Id.
45. See HANE, supra note 17, at 179 (discussing the different rights held by hus-
bands and wives). The husband could also have several wives, while a woman was
expected to remain faithful even after the death of her husband. Id. See also HOZUMI,
supra note 44, at 138 (detailing the Seven Grounds of Divorce under the Taiho Codes
House-Law). A husband was able to divorce his wife for any of the following reasons:
1) sterility; 2) adultery; 3) disobedience to the father-in-law or the mother-in-law; 4)
loquacity; 5) larceny; 6) jealousy; and 7) disease. Id. These grounds applied only with
respect to a husband divorcing his wife. Id.
46. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 94. HANE, supra note 17, at 161.
Initially, three tairo were appointed to function as a group. Id. This number was re-
duced over time, until eventually, only one councilor held the position of tairo. Id.
47. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 94. See HANE, supra note 17, at
161 (describing the role of the roju).
48. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 94. See HANE, supra note 17, at
161 (stating that censors were put in place to watch the buke).
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hostages in Edo.49 Generally, these mechanisms ensured an efficient
and relatively incorruptible system capable of self-governance.
The vicarious liability of a father, as head of the family, served as an
additional check on power within local government units.50 The father
was accountable for the public, as well as the private actions and duties
of his family, and often received punishment for the crimes of vil-
ligers 1 This vicarious liability reinforced the idea that the individual
had no legal existence apart from his membership in a group, family,
village, or class.
Group status and membership embodied the basis of morality under
Confucian values.52 The ethic of loyalty, which permeated every rela-
tionship in Japanese society, was a cornerstone of the Confucian value
system.53 These relationships54 provided the only means by which the
Confucian virtue of jen-a state of consciousness reflecting the individ-
ual's compassion-could be achieved. 55 In dispute resolution, individu-
als sought the solution that would contribute to the greatest jen be-
tween the parties. 6
49. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 94. See HANE, supra note 17, at
160 (explaining the daimyo's temporary residence in Edo and their fiefs).
50. See JAPAN: A SHORT CULTURAL HISTORY, supra note 7, at 357-58 (discussing
the role of family heads in overseeing the conduct of the household); see also MASON
& CAIGER, supra note 13, at 209 (noting the father's duties to manage the affairs and
property of the family).
51. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 104-05. JAPAN: A SHORT CUL-
TURAL HISTORY, supra note 7, at 357-58.
52. See ROBERT ARMSTRONG, LIGHT FROM THE EAST: STUDIES IN JAPANESE CON-
FUCIANISM 236-40 (1974) (illustrating the concept of a moral system based on a per-
sonal self-realization of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom).
53. See JAPAN: A SHORT CULTURAL HISTORY, supra note 7, at 110-13 (outlining
the Confucian principles of obedience to the family and state, and the belief that
human nature is naturally inclined to do good works). Confucius, who lived in China
from 551 to 479 B.C., taught that the family is the basic social unit. Id. at 112. Chil-
dren owe strict obedience to the teaching of both ancestors and living parents. Id. Ac-
cording to Confucius, this family structure provides the model for Chinese society in
general, with the emperor being regarded as the supreme father figure. Id. See also
HANE, supra note 17, at 183 (noting that Confucian philosophy emphasized four basic
princples: culture, conduct, loyalty, and faithfulness).
54. See David J. Danelski, The Supreme Court of Japan: An Exploratory Study,
in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 122-23 (G. Schubert and D. Danelski eds. 1969)
[hereinafter Danelski] (describing how the impersonal relationships among Japanese
reflect the failure to recognize each individual as a separate, self-determined being).
Confucius emphasized five criticle relationships in society: ruler and subject, father and
son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, friend and friend. HANE,
supra note 17, at 183.
55. See HANE, supra note 17, at 175, 183 (discussing the importance of righteous-
ness and benevolence within the important societal relationships emphasized by
Confucius).
56. Danelski, supra note 54, at 123. See also Yoshiro Hiramatsu, Tokugawa Law,
14 L. IN JAPAN 1, 37-38 (1981) [hereinafter Hiramatsu] (listing reasons that Toku-
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To advance jen, Tokugawa Japan had a two stage dispute resolution
process. In the first stage, the village headman, or nanushi, organized
a five-family committee which had jurisdiction over both persons and
property. 57 The reputation of the headman, both within his village and
within the higher government structure, rested on his ability to main-
tain a harmonious community.5 8 If the efforts of the nanushi and the
village organization failed, the dispute moved to the Tokugawa
courts.5 9 The daikan, the shogun's local representative, presided over
the lower Tokugawa court and heard "suits of first instance" that the
nanushi brought on behalf of the village. 0 Severe penalties, including
banishment, attached to one who reasserted a settled claim or who
brought unfounded charges.6 1 Thus, a case's outcome was usually pre-
determined before it went to court.
B. TOKUGAWA CIVIL PROCEDURE
The civil procedure which governed the limited range of claims that
could be brought under the Tokugawa judicial system varied im-
mensely depending upon the subject of the claim. Land and water dis-
putes received the most attention; suits and claims for money were af-
forded less protection; suits involving Confucian feudal and family
relationships were rejected completely and complainants were often
punished. 2 The amount of protection extended to each type of claim
reflected the relative value the shogunate attached to the claim.
1. Land and Water Disputes
The shogunate's fiscal policy, as well as its power structure, was built
on rice crops and land. Thus, lawsuits involving land disputes, or ron-
sho, between and within villages were of great economic and political
gawa leaders encouraged conciliations between parties). Hiramatsu provides six reasons
Tokugawa administrators encouraged conciliation in private disputes: (1) more con-
crete settlement than by a judicial ruling, (2) respect for local customs of order and
discipline, (3) encourages social harmony, (4) compensates for the lack of developed
private law, (5) reduces the need for administrative facilities, (6) promotes the
Shogunate's policy of refusing to interfere in local matters. Id.
57. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 98-99. See also HAME, supra note
18, at 177 (describing local administrative mechanisms).
58. Aspects of Tokugawa Law. supra note 13, at 98-99.
59. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 98-99.
60. Aspects of Tokugawa Law. supra note 13, at 98-99.
61. Aspects of Tokugawa Law, supra note 13, at 98-99.
62. See KINGO KOBAYAKAWA, A STUDY OF THE CIVIL LITIGATION SYSTEM IN THE
RECENT ERA 127-55 (1957) [hereinafter KOBAYAKAWA] (discussing the types of
claims that people could bring in Tokugawa courts).
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interest to the shogunate.63 Typically, ronsho arose between villages
over water flow, floods, accretion, and new reclamation.6 4 The Toku-
gawa courts encouraged local settlement of land and water disputes be-
cause they believed that those at the village level better understood the
frequently complicated local issues.65 Additionally, the village dispute
resolution process, basho-jukudan, was calculated to preserve and re-
spect local customs regarding land and water rights.66 After the basho
jukudan settled disagreements, the parties drafted a document of reso-
lution and the dispute ended without a court appearance.6 7
The process of karisumashi provided another intermediate procedure
in which Tokugawa government officials made an attempt at provi-
sional settlement. Under the karisumashi procedure, a Tokugawa offi-
cial traveled to the location of the dispute and arranged an agreement
between the parties.68 The agreement, in the form of a temporary judg-
ment, remained in effect for three to five years, after which, the contin-
ued equity of the settlement was reviewed. 9
2. Claims for Money
Claims for money, contract rights, and obligations arising out of
commerce, called kuji, constituted the most frequent type of suit in the
Tokugawa courts, especially among commoners.7 0 Kuji proliferated as
merchants attempted to assert their rights as creditors, particularly
63. See Otake, The General Principle of Private Settlement in the Procedural Law
of Water Use in the Recent Era, I STUD. LAEGAL HIST. 183-212 (1953) (stating that in
an economy built on rice growing, water disputes were important and frequent).
64. Id.
65. See RYOSUKE ISHn, LEGAL MATERIALS 258 (1951) (examining the Tokugawa
courts' preference for local settlements); see also Hiramatsu, supra note 56, at 37
(stating that conciliation was encouraged in money suits, and made a requirement in
water disputes before a petition could be filed by the plaintiff).
66. See Hiramatsu, supra note 56, at 37-38 (describing considerations influencing
local dispute resolution).
67. See Hiramatsu, supra note 56, at 37 (stating that upon agreeing to a resolu-
tion, the parties drafted a sumikuchi shomon, or settlement deed, which had the same
effect as an official judgment).
68. Kingo Kobayakawa, Concerning the Litigation Procedure Involving Land
Suits, 37 KYOTO L. REV. 65, 72 (1937) [hereinafter Litigation Procedure Involving
Land Suits].
69. See id. (discussing the nature of the temporary judgment).
70. See Hiramatsu, supra note 56, at 34-35 (discussing the types of money suits
brought by commoners during the Tokugawa era). Suits dealing in matters of com-
merce were classified in two categories. Id. at 34. First, "money suits" were claims for
repayment, usually as compensation for borrowed gold or silver. Id. Second, "main
suits" dealt with matters such as payment for pledged houses or land, payment for
tenancy, disputes over the legality of transactions, and wages of servants. Id.
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against the samurai members of the buke.1 The Tokugawa courts
treated kuji against buke members less favorably than kuji against
commoners because of the buke's preeminent status in Tokugawa
Japan. 2
In approximately 1720, the shogun issued decrees that completely
barred judicial handling of money claims by merchants against samu-
rai73 The shogunate issued these decrees in order to relieve warriors
and shogunate retainers from debt to their subordinates. 4 These mu-
tual settlement decrees required creditors and debtors to settle all cur-
rent claims out of court or not at all, and disallowed future claims.73
3. Mutual Affairs and Confucian Relationships
There were two classes of cases to which the shogunate courts ex-
tended no protection: mutual affairs and Confucian relationships. Mu-
tual affairs were commercial enterprises in which businessmen made
joint decisions and shared profits. 6 As joint ventures in business and
internal squabbles among participants affected no vital shogunate in-
terests, the Tokugawa courts did not accept mutual affairs suits and
required the parties to settle." By preventing official recourse to the
courts, the shogunate forced citizens to rely on obligations made in
good faith.
78
Suits involving Confucian feudal and family relationships, such as
those between a lord and his retainer or between a parent and child,
also received little attention from the Tokugawa courts.79 What scant
legal treatment was available hinged upon whether the parties involved
71. DANIEL FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW - ToKU.-
GAWA AND MODERN 106-07 (1965).
72. Id. In 1661, 1719, 1789, and 1843 the shogun issued Mutual Settlement Ordi-
nances refusing to hear certain "money suit" petitions. Hiramatsu, supra note 56, at
35. Cancellation Ordinances were also issued in 1789, 1842, and 1843, simply nullified
certain claims, declaring them to be worthless. Id.
73. CHARLES D. SHELDON, THE RISE OF THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA
JAPAN: 1600-1868 105-08 (1958) (asserting that the prevention of litigation by
merchants against samurai was motivated by a desire to preserve the feudal system by
freeing the samurai from financial distress).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Kanada, Mutual Affairs from the Standpoint of the Law of Our Recent
Era, 46 J. A. POL. & Soc. Scl. 545, 545-63, 683-708 (1932) (describing the differ-
ences between mutual affairs and Confucian relationships).
77. JOHN HALL, JAPANESE FEUDAL LAWS 186 (1979).
78. Id.
79. Kingo Kobayakawa, Two or Three Problems in Civil Litigation of the Recent
Era, 39 KYOTO L. REV. 527-72, 777-816 (1938) [hereinafter Problems in Civil
Litigation].
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were members of the same class.80 The Tokugawa courts only accepted
suits brought by inferiors when they involved succession.81 The courts'
nearly absolute refusal to review such suits was a natural consequence
of Tokugawa Japan's rigid class structure and adherence to Confucian
values. The duty of loyal subordination, entrenched in both the feudal
state and the family, became the chief instrument of social discipline.
82
Therefore, the review of suits brought by Confucian inferiors was seen
as undermining the existing social order.83 In fact, unless the shogun's
interest was involved and the superior was at fault, the court assessed
penalties against the inferior who filed suit against his superior.8 4 Ser-
vants at fault were punished, with the master of the servant having
complete discretion over the severity of the punishment. 85
The Tokugawa government eventually adopted Article 65 of the
Osadamegaki,8 which stated that the courts would not hear an infer-
ior's suit against his superior except under a limited set of circum-
stances.87 The Article presumes that the subordinate, regardless of
whether his accusation is true, is almost as reprehensible as the ac-
cused, simply for questioning his superior's innocence. 88 Exemplifying
the Tokugawa determination to discourage false suits, Article 65, Part
1, condemned to crucifixion any inferior who filed such a suit.89
80. See KOBAYAKAWA, supra note 62, at 616-19 (describing the nature of class-
based suits).
81. KOBAYAKAWA, supra note 62, at 616-19.
82. KOBAYAKAWA, supra note 62, at 616-19.
83. KOBAYAKAWA, supra note 62, at 616-19.
84. KOBAYAKAWA, supra note 62, at 616-19.
85. See KOBAYAKAWA, supra note 61, at 619 (explaining the nature of
punishment).
86. JOHN HALL, JAPANESE FEUDAL LAWS 223-24 (1979).
87. Id. Article 65 of the Osadamegaki provides:
1. A person who falsely accuses his master or parents of committing a serious
offense will be crucified.
2. Where a master or parent has been accused of an offense, if it is a serious
matter involving the government, a detailed investigation will be conducted.
If the accusations of the petitioner are true, the accused will submit a request
to the government to lessen the penalty against him by one degree. He will also
request that the government penalize the accuser himself at a punishment one
degree less than that to which the accused is sentenced.
Where matters submitted for adjudication do not involve the government, they
will not be accepted by the courts.
3. When a master or parent is at fault and pleads hardship, certain village
officials and relatives will be summoned to dispose satisfactorily of the matter
upon request for relief by the accused. Id.
88. Id. at 223.
89. Id.
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The courts also applied special procedures in divorce cases." A wife
in a marriage between commoners had no standing to obtain a di-
vorce,9' but in extreme cases of mistreatment, the nanushi could inter-
vene and conciliate. 92 Conversely, a husband in a marriage between
commoners could divorce his wife for a variety of reasons, but primar-
ily for her failure to perpetuate the family line.93 To effectuate a di-
vorce, a husband simply presented his wife with a piece of paper stating
he would have no objection if she were to remarry.9" Buke divorces
were treated differently from divorces between commoners. The buke
followed formal divorce procedures that required the parties and their
families to work out a mutually agreeable arrangement, which was
then submitted to the shogun for approval.95
III. THE OPENING OF JAPAN TO THE WEST
The cultural emphasis on conciliation and consensus became en-
trenched in Japanese society during the self-imposed isolation of the
Tokugawa era.9 6 Then, in 1853, Japan emerged from its isolation when
Commodore Perry delivered a letter from United States President Fill-
more requesting that Japan reopen itself to the world."' The Emperor
eventually complied with President Fillmore's request and by 1858, Ja-
pan had concluded commercial treaties with the United States" and a
90. See HozUmi, supra note 44, at 138-431 (discussing the history of divorce law
in Japan).
91. See Hozum, supra note 44, at 138 (discussing the Seven Grounds for Divorce
available to husbands under the Taiho Code).
92. HozuMi, supra note 44, at 138.
93. See Hozuti, supra note 44, at 145 (stating that a husband was free to divorce
his wife if she failed to deliver him any male children). A man was morally compelled
by his ancestors to divorce his wife in such an instance because he had a duty to con-
tinue the family line. Id. at 139.
94. See RYOSUKE ISHII, GENERAL SURVEY OF JAPANESE LEGAL HISTORY 586
(1960) [hereinafter GENERAL SURVEY OF JAPANESE LEGAL HISTORY] (outlining the
divorce procedures). The wife had no more legal right to avoid being divorced arbitrar-
ily than she had to obtain a divorce herself. Id. In exceptional cases, however, such as
after twelve months of desertion, the wife could divorce the husband. Id.
95. RYOSUKE ISHII, A MISCELLANY OF THE EDO PERIOD 152 (1959).
96. See generally CHITOSHI YANAGA, JAPAN SINCE PERRY (1949) [hereinafter
YANAGA].
97. See W.G. BEASLEY, THE MEIJ RESTORATION 88-89 (1972) [hereinafter BEAS-
LEY] (discussing Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan in 1852-53).
98. Convention between the United States of America and Japan, Regulating the
Intercourse of American Citizens with Japan, June 17, 1857, reprinted in CENTRE FOR
EAST ASIAN CULTURAL STUDIES, 1 MEIJI JAPAN THROUGH CONTEMPORARY SOURCES
16 (1969) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY SOURCES); Treaty of Amity and Commerce,
United States-Japan, July 29, 1858, reprinted in CONTEMPORARY SOURCES at 27.
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host of other Western nations. 99 In these treaties, Japan accepted gen-
erally unfavorable conditions regarding extraterritoriality in which
Western judicial officers oversaw dispute resolution in accordance with
Western laws.100 The treaties were humiliating to the Japanese govern-
ment, which eventually felt obligated to do away with them.' 0 '
A. THE MEIJI RESTORATION
In 1867, the last shogun handed back his political powers to the em-
peror and the system of military government that had lasted 700 years
ended.'0 2 The Meiji Restoration had begun.
One of the major challenges of the Meiji Restoration was the main-
tenance of Japanese independence from the West.10 3 To achieve this
goal, the new government modernized the social and political organiza-
tion of the country based on the principles of capitalism. 0 4 The legal
system was among the first to undergo major restructuring. 10 5
99. Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, Great Britain-Japan, Aug. 26, 1857
reprinted in CONTEMPORARY SOURCES at 36; Treaty Russia-Japan, Feb. 7, 1855 re-
printed in CONTEMPORARY SOURCES at 6; Treaty of Commerce, The Netherlands-Ja-
pan, Jan. 30, 1856, reprinted in CONTEMPORARY SOURCES at 8; Additional Articles to
the Treaty between The Netherlands and Japan of 1856, Oct. 16, 1857 reprinted in
CONTEMPORARY SOURCES at 18.
100. See FRANCIS CLIFFORD JONES, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN AND THE
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS RESULTING IN ITS ABOLITION, 1885-99 5 (1931) (discussing
extraterritoriality). The Western nations demanded that if their nationals were involved
in a legal dispute with the Japanese, the issue would be tried by a judicial officer of the
Western nation in accordance with the law of that nation. Id.
101. See ASIAN CONTRACT LAW: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PROBLEMS 6 (David A.
Allen ed., 1969) (describing the national consensus to abolish the system of
extraterritoriality).
102. BEASLEY, supra note 97, at 277.
103. YANAGA, supra note 96, at 10.
104. See JOHANNES HIRSCHMEIER, THE ORIGINS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN MEIJI
JAPAN 69-245 (1964) (focusing on the initiative from the center, the spirit of enterprise
in the private sector and the formative influence of entrepreneurial performance); WIL-
LIAM LOCKWOOD, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN: GROWTH AND STRUC-
TURAL CHANGE, 1868-1938 3-28 (expanded ed. 1968) (examining the foundations of
industrialism during the Meiji era in terms of background, framework, and rise of
modern industry and trade); THOMAS SMITH, POLITICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DE-
VELOPMENT IN JAPAN: GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES, 1868-1880 1-86 (1955) (docu-
menting the rise of modern industry and the introduction of Western technologies and
methods including the building of Western style shipyards, iron foundries and arsenals
during the Tokugawa period).
105. See JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA 57-127 (R. Ishii 1969) [herein-
after JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA] (tracing the entry phase in the devel-
opment of the law during 1868-81 and the influence of Western jurisprudence); see
also Konzo Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law,
1868-1961, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 5 (Arthur
T. von Mehren ed., 1963) [hereinafter Takayanagi] (noting sweeping policy changes
transforming feudal Japan into a modern state).
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The French Code became the foundation of the post-Tokugawa legal
system in Japan.1 0 6 However, despite an official government request for
a translation of the French Code, the Japanese government did not use
it, and instead established a Japanese drafting committee chaired by a
French professor, Gustave Boissonade.10 7 Boissonade drafted the crimi-
nal law which the legislature adopted in 1880.08 Thereafter, he began
to work on property law, with the Japanese committee drafting portions
related to traditional mores.10 9 Finally, by 1891, the Japanese legisla-
ture and the Imperial Diet modified and adopted Boissonade's and the
committee's drafts.
10
Despite its legislative adoption, a faction of Japanese lawyers fought
against acceptance of the new code arguing that it did not sufficiently
reflect traditional customs and mores."' This led the Diet in 1890 to
vote for the postponement of its implementation, signalling the decline
of French legal influence in post-Tokugawa Japan.'
1 2
The lower class bushi led a liberal political movement that briefly
gained popular support as an advocate of individual human rights and
capitalism." 3 The government, however, squelched the movement and
secretly began drafting a new constitution based on the Prussian
model."14 Under the absolutist Prussian model adopted in 1889, the
Emperor granted rights to his subjects who were not considered to have
been born with rights, as was the case under the French model.'"
106. See Takayanagi, supra note 105, at 5-40 (describing the legal institutional
and human aspects of the Japanese reception of Western law and denoting the numer-
ous drafts of the new code).
107. Takayanagi, supra note 105, at 27-31.
108. JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA, supra note 105, at 528-29.
109. JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA, supra note 105, at 493.
110. See Gustave Boissonade, Ecole de Droit de Jedo, REVUE DE LEGISLATION
511, 511 (1874) (conveying Boissonade's opinion that Japan should not adopt purely
French law, but should instead adopt any form of Western law which had proven effec-
tive in the Western experience). Boissonade also drafted a law on the organization of
Japanese courts. JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA, supra note 105, at 480.
However, in 1891 the Japanese cabinet, the Genro-In, chose to adopt a proposal
drafted by a German, Otto Rudolf. Id.
11l. See generally KENNETH B. PYLE, THE NEW GENERATION IN MEIJI JAPAN:
PROBLEMS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY, 1885-1895 (1969).
112. RICHARD STORRY, A HISTORY OF MODERN JAPAN 107 (1960).
113. See generally GEORGE M. BECKMANN, THE MAKING OF THE MEIJI CONSTI-
TUTION 61-68 (1957) [hereinafter BECKMANN] (discussing the rise of the democratic
movement including the formation of the liberal party, Jixuto, and the Constitutional
Reform Party, Rikken Kashinto).
114. See id. at 61-66 (discussing the supression of popular protest).
115. See id. at 66-68 (discussing the Prussian model).
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Another code-drafting committee was commissioned in 1893.116 The
new committee eventually abandoned the scheme of the French Code
and substituted it with that of the German Civil Code, the Burgerliches
Gestzbuch. 117 In 1898, the Diet adopted the new Five Book code, re-
taining not only many of Boissonade's provisions, but also borrowing
from other European codes.1 18
B. OTHER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Court System
Like the Constitution and codes, the Japanese patterned their revised
judicial system after the French system. Unlike the French judiciary,
however, the Japanese judiciary did not begin to become independent
until an autonomous supreme court, the Daishinin, was established in
1875.119 Once the government adopted the German-based Constitution,
the Japanese courts changed to reflect the German influence. Otto Ru-
dolph, a German jurist, drafted the Court Organization Law, which
went into effect in 1890, and governed the operation of the Japanese
judiciary until the United States occupation following World War 1I.120
Despite a judiciary organized in accordance with a Western Euro-
pean framework, conflict resolution in Japan remained firmly rooted in
the past.' The Japanese resorted to the more convenient and less ex-
pensive informal dispute settlement devices that had functioned in
Tokugawa Japan. 2 To encourage the continued use of conciliation, the
116. See GENERAL SURVEY OF JAPANESE LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 94, at 591
(discussing the variety of codes the committee considered).
117. See GENERAL SURVEY OF JAPANESE LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 94, at 91
(observing that the commission used the old code with French orientation and made
revisions of the new code with reference to the German code).
118. See GENERAL SURVEY OF JAPANESE LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 94, at 591
(stating that the commission considered civil codes from Holland, Austria, Saxony,
Spain, Zurich, Belgium, Russia, Montenegro, Portugal, and California while drafting
the Japanese Code).
119. See JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA, supra note 105, at 284-86
(offering that the Japanese Supreme Court failed to establish complete judicial inde-
pendence from the government cabinet, the Genro-In). In 1875, regulations were en-
acted which gave the Justice Minister the authority to dimiss judges. Id. at 287. This,
according to Ishii, was just one of several factors which prevented the Japanese judici-
ary from enjoying personal security and independence. Id. at 286-87.
120. See JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA, supra note 105, at 480.
121. See generally Harold See, The Judiciary and Dispute Resolution in Japan: A
Survey, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 339, 345-47 (1982) [hereinafter The Judiciary and
Dispute Resolution in Japan] (discussing the feudal principles that still guided Japan
in the late 1800s).
122. See Zensuke Ishimura, Empirical Jurisprudence in Japan, in GLENDON
SCHUBERT & DAVID J. DANELSKI, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 49, 49-50
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Justice Ministry established a conciliation procedure called kankai, in
which dispute resolution methods were patterned after those used in the
Tokugawa courts."2 3 In fact, an 1875 ordinance provided that Toku-
gawa custom would apply to civil suits in the absence of an appropriate
law12 4 - including efforts toward conciliation. 25 Under the traditional
procedures of conciliation, or naizumni,126 a party to litigation would
first sign an application for conciliation.1 27 The parties then had three
days to meet and accept or deny mediation.12 8 Failure of either party to
appear could result in punishment.1 29 Thereafter, the parties were
granted a certain time period to resolve their dipute.130
Formal conciliation procedures emerged in 1922 when the Diet en-
acted the practice of chotei into law in the Land Lease and House
Lease Conciliation Law. 3' The law was designed to address problems
that arose out of the conflict between traditional customs that governed
the feudal landlord-tenant relationship'3 2 and modern property law
concepts contained in the Civil Code, such as freedom of contract and
free alienability.133 The government believed that the Land Lease and
House Lease Conciliation Law would both engender harmonious settle-
(1969) (discussing the return to informal dispute resolution mechanisms of the Toku-
gawa period).
123. See JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEII ERA, supra note 105, at 308-10,
492-93 (explaining the kankai procedure).
124. See RYOSUKE ISHII, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN 23-25
(1980) (discussing the Dajokan system).
125. See JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA, supra note 105, at 308 (stat-
ing that the Tokugawa court system accepted conciliation as a means for resolving
private disputes).
126. JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA, supra note 105, at 308. Naizumi
is the traditional term for conciliation during the Tokugawa period. Id.
127. JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA, supra note 105, at 309.
128. JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJ ERA, supra note 105, at 309.
129. JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEII ERA, supra note 105, at 309.
130. JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJ ERA, supra note 105, at 309-10. Before
the time period ended, the applicant for conciliation could request an extension. Id.
Failure to make a timely request forfeited that applicant's claim in the dispute. Id. at
310.
131. See NOBURO MIYAZAKI, HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE CONCILIATION SYSTEM
112-18 (1957) [hereinafter MIYAZAKI] (explaining that a chotei bill was introduced in
the Diet in 1911); see generally Tukeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contem-
porary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN, THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOcIETY 41, 46
(Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963) [hereinafter Kawashima] (discussing dispute resolu-
tion methods used in modern Japan).
132. See The Judiciary and Dispute Resolution in Japan, supra note 121, at 356-
57 (explaining the chotei).
133. See generally MINPO (Civil Code) OF 1909, art. 617 (stipulating tenants'
rights against landlords). Under Art. 617, if the duration of the lease was not fixed, the
landlord could terminate the lease at will. Id. A tenant in this situation, however, had a
three month grace period following the landlord's request. Id.
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ments and avoid litigation aimed at vindicating individual rights.134 Af-
ter the Land Lease and House Lease Conciliation Law, the government
enacted a series of laws extending the chotei system into other areas of
law.13 5 Several of the chotei laws included a provision allowing the
court to issue an order disposing of the controversy if chotei failed. 130
2. The Meiji Constitution
The Meiji Constitution, 137 promulgated in 1889, reflected the tradi-
tional preference for conciliation over litigation, created a weak judici-
ary, and modified the role of the divine emperor. 138 The Constitution
established an absolute monarchy in which sovereignty resided in the
emperor who was designated the head of state and had all executive
power.'3 9 While the Constitution created executive,140 legislative,' 4' and
judicial branches, "' there was no real separation of powers and no
mechanism of checks and balances." 3 The Japanese judiciary could not
effectively prevent adjudicatory disputes between individuals and the
state because the emperor, not the individual, was sovereign under the
Constitution." 4 Furthermore, the emperor, through his Minister of Jus-
tice, controlled the organization of the judiciary and possessed the
power to review all decisions pertaining to political offenses.'"
134. See W. KOYAMA, GENERAL SURVEY OF CIVIL CONCILIATION LAW 5-6 (1954)
(noting that the government did not look favorably upon the potential explosion in
property-related litigation, believing that such litigation emphasized individual rights
and, therefore, was not in keeping with traditional Japanese means of dispute
settlement).
135. See Kawashima, supra note 131, at 55 n.35 (noting other laws which incorpo-
rated chotei).
136. See MIYAZAKI, supra note 131, at 54-61 (discussing the court's options for
using chotei, including a procedure called Substitution of Trial for Conciliation).
137. KENPO (Constitution), reprinted in JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI
ERA, supra note 105, at 725 app. 11 [hereinafter MEIJI KENPO].
138. See generally BECKMANN, supra note 113 (providing historical background on
Japan's constitutional development from 1868 to 1891); see also E. HERBERT NORMAN,
JAPAN'S EMERGENCE AS A MODERN STATE 185-90 (1940) (reviewing the impact of the
Constitution of 1889 on the government structure and political parties).
139. MEIJI KENPO ch. I.
140. MEIJI KENPO ch. IV.
141. MEIJI KENPO ch. III.
142. MEIJI KENPO ch. V.
143. See John M. Maki, The Japanese Constitutional Style 43, WASH. L. REV.
893, 896 (1968) (discussing the 1889 Constitution).
144. MEIJI KENPO, ch. I, art. IV.
145. See David J. Danelski, The People and the Court in Japan, in FRONTIERS OF
JUDICIAL RESEARCH 45, 47 [hereinafter The People and the Court in Japan] (observ-




Despite its constitutionally limited authority, the judiciary attempted
to establish a degree of independence in the Otsu case in 1891.146 In
Otsu, a Japanese policeman attempted to murder a Russian crown
prince who was traveling in Japan, shocking the nation and causing
fear of grave repercussions from the Russians .14 As the Japanese penal
code did not punish offenses against members of a foreign royal house-
hold, the policeman's crime fell within the jurisdiction of the general
murder statute, which carried a maximum penalty of life imprison-
ment.148 The Japanese government wanted to employ the death pen-
alty, but the court refused to capitulate to the government's demand
and instead sentenced the policeman to life imprisonment.1 4 Thus, the
Otsu case represents the first instance in which the judiciary exercised
autonomy from the emperor."'
An ultra-nationalist autocracy ascended to power in Japan following
the onset of economic depression in 1927 and remained in power
through the conclusion of the Second World War.10' Even during those
authoritarian years, the Japanese judiciary did not submit its power to
the emperor."6 2 In fact, when Prime Minister Tojo once criticized the
judiciary for its uncooperative attitude and threatened it with remedial
action, a president of one of the courts of appeal sent a letter of protest
to him.153 Although incidents such as this were rare, they did suggest
that the Japanese judiciary had established a foundation for
independence.
146. Takayanagi, supra note 105, at 9.
147. Takayanagi, supra note 105, at 9.
148. Takayanagi, supra note 105, at 9-10 (providing that life imprisonment was
the maximum punishment for an ordinary attempt at murder).
149. Takayanagi, supra note 105, at 10 (stating that the government wanted the
prisoner to receive the death penalty under an application of analogous provisions con-
cerning offenses against the imperial household).
150. See The Judiciary and Dispute Resolution in Japan, supra note 121, at 346
(stating that the Otsu case marked the beginning of Japanese judicial independence).
151. See The Judiciary and Dispute Resolution in Japan, supra note 121, at 12
(explaining that the seizure of political rule by army extremists and the reinstitution of
"bureaucratic absolution" stalled the development of popular parliamentary participa-
tion in the 1930s).
152. See Takaaki Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its Historical Develop-
ment and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN, THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCI-
ETY 111, 122 at n.40 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963) (depicting instances in which
the courts refused to convict citizens who had criticized the government).
153. Id.
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IV. THE POST-WAR YEARS
After Japan's defeat in World War II, the old system collapsed.
154
The American occupation forces, organized under the aegis of the Su-
preme Commander of Allied Powers, sought to end both the militarism
and authoritarianism of its former enemy. 155 The United States wanted
to pacify Japan to ensure that it never again would be a foreign policy
and military threat. 156 To attain peace, the United States implemented
various measures to democratize Japan's political, social, and economic
processes and institutions.15 7 The occupation planners believed that de-
mocracy led to peace, was superior to other political systems, and
would liberate the population. 58 One of the first attempts at this exper-
iment in democracy involved the creation of a new constitution for
Japan.
A. A NEW CONSTITUTION
The Japanese government worked on several drafts of a new consti-
tution, but in 1946 eventually introduced a version that had been
secretly drafted by the Allies.' 59 The Emperor officially promulgated
the new Constitution in 1946 and it became effective on May 3,
1947. i60
Popular sovereignty, individual rights, and the separation of powers
were three major ideals of the Constitution. Unlike the Meiji Constitu-
154. See HALL, supra note 22, at 352 (stating that the new constitution, which was
adopted in 1947, "fundamentally" altered the political structure in Japan. Id.
155. United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, 13 DEP'T STATE BULL.
423 (1945).
156. See HALL, supra note 22, at 351-52 (outlining United States efforts to demili-
tarize Japan). Hall points out that, after World War II, the United States occupation
force had three primary objectives: demilitarization, democratization, and rehabilita-
tion. Id. at 351. The demilitarization effort resulted in the complete destruction of Ja-
pan's armed forces and military industrial base, dissolution of the ministries of the
army and navy, and the complete surrender of all wartime gains. Id. Additionally, over
180,000 Japanese leaders were removed from office, and 25 officials were prosecuted
for war crimes. Id.
157. See Kurt Steiner, Foreword to ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCU-
PIED JAPAN, vii (1976) (detailing that the occupation planners found legal support for
their attempts to democratize Japanese institutions in the Japanese acceptance of the
Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender).
158. See id. at vii-viii. MacArthur wrote: "History will clearly show that the entire
human race, irrespective of geographical limitations or cultural tradition, is capable of
absorbing, cherishing and defending liberty, tolerance, and justice, and will have maxi-
mum strength and progress when so blessed." Id. at viii.
159. See ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN, 43-49 (1976)
(evaluating Allied influence in drafting the Japanese Constitution and efforts toward
forcing the nation to accept its provisions).
160. Id. at 52.
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tion, the 1947 Constitution gave sovereignty to the people, rather than
vesting it in the Emperor.16' This new document guaranteed to the Jap-
anese people, among other things, equal protection under the law,
162
universal adult suffrage, 6 3 freedom of thought and conscience,' s4 free-
dom of assembly and association, 6 " and academic freedom.' 66 The
1947 Constitution also provided that all people could have access to the
courts 6 7 and further established separation of powers among the three
branches of the government, thereby dramatically reducing the Em-
peror's power. 6 The document expanded the power of the judiciary in
two ways: (1) it established an independent judiciary with rule-making
power led by the Saikosai (Supreme Court), and (2) it allowed for
judicial review of legislative and executive decisions.'69
B. THE JUDICIARY
1. Judicial Review
The judiciary, like the other branches of government, was not accus-
tomed to using this new-found power of judicial review.17 Japanese
legal scholars were divided on whether the Saikosai should exercise
judicial review under the United States case or controversy scenario' 7
or, under the continental form as practiced in Austria and West Ger-
many, where judicial review occurs only at the invitation of certain ex-
ecutive and legislative bodies.' 72 The confusion over the legislative in-
161. 1947 KENPO (CONSTITUTION) preamble [hereinafter 1947 KENPO].
162. Id. art. 14.
163. Id. art. 15.3.
164. Id. art. 19.
165. Id. art. 21.
166. Id. art. 23.
167. Id. art. 32.
168. Id. arts. 41, 65, 76. The 1947 Constitution reduced the Emperor's role to that
of a figurehead. Id. arts. 1-8. The Emperor was limited to engaging in actions only to
the extent provided for in the Constitution. Id. art. 4. In fact, the Constitution granted
the Emperor no governmental powers and he could only act with regard to matters of
state after consultation with the Cabinet. Id. arts. 3-4.
169. See The People and the Court in Japan, supra note 145, at 49 (noting that
the 1946 Constitution instituted four major reforms concerning the judiciary); Daniel
Fenno Henderson, Japanese Judicial Review of Legislation: The First Twenty Years,
in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67 115 (D. Hender-
son ed., 1968) (observing that the judiciary's new power derived from two ideas in-
cluded in the 1947 Constitution: (1) popular government necessarily implies govern-
ment restricted by law; and (2) any law, constitutional or otherwise, provides
justiciable rights in the courts of law).
170. Henderson, supra note 169, at 115.
171. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
172. See Henderson, supra note 169, at 120 (distinguishing Austrian and West
German practice).
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tent was the basis for this scholarly debate which was so important for
constitutional interpretation."'
In the 1948 case of Komatsu v. Japan, the Saikosai in dicta, re-
jected the continental form of review. 174 In 1952, in Suzuki v. Ja-
pan,175 the Saikosai formally rejected the continental form of review in
favor of the case or controversy approach, declaring that it could exer-
cise judicial review with respect to constitutional questions only if such
questions arose in a legal case or controversy. 78 Some members of the
dissent argued that if the court adhered to the American form of re-
view, it would dominate the other branches of government and thus,
usurp their authority.
177
Despite its legitimate independence, the Saikosai has only reluc-
tantly exercised its new-found power of judicial review.'7 In the first
sixteen years after the adoption of the 1947 Constitution, the court de-
clared only two statutes unconstitutional .7 First, in the 1953 case of
Sakagami v. Japan, the Supreme Court declared an act of the Diet
unconstitutional. 80 This decision, however, had little practical signifi-
cance because the law was no longer in effect at the time it was de-
clared unconstitutional.' 8"
The second time the court invalidated a Diet enactment was in the
1962 case of Nakamura v. Japan.'8 2 Nakamura was one of a group of
individuals who tried to smuggle textiles from Japan to Korea.
8 3
173. See Henderson, supra note 169, at 120 (explaining that the scholars who sup-
ported the continental form of review argued that Article 81's specific grant of judicial
review to the Saikosai transformed it into a constitutional court).
174. Komatsu v. Japan, 2 Keishu 801, 806 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1948), reprinted in
JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME DEcISIONS
1948-60 362-65 (1964). The court declared that "Article 81 of our Constitution should
be characterized as an explicit provision adopting the type of judicial review which has
been established by the United States by way of mere interpretation of the Constitu-
tion." Id.
175. Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Minshu 783 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1952).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 784-85.
178. See David J. Danelski, The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court,
49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 959 (1974) [hereinafter The Political Impact of the
Japanese Supreme Court] (contending that the Saikosai avoided reviewing the consti-
tutionality of crucial statutes and treaties through classifying such cases as nonjusticia-
ble political questions).
179. Id. at 960.
180. Sakagami v. Japan, 7 Keishu 1562 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1953).
181. Id. See also Daniel Fenno Henderson, Japanese Judicial Review of Legisla-
tion: The First Twenty Years, 43 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1017-28 (1968) (discussing the
Sakagami decision).
182. Nakamura v. Japan, 16 Keishu 1593 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1962).
183. See The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court, supra note 178, at
960 (dicussing the facts of the Nakamura case).
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Nakamura and his cohorts were captured and the textiles confiscated
pursuant to Article 118(1) of the Customs Law.'" The textiles' owner
appealed, contending that his property had been seized unconstitution-
ally because Article 118(1) did not provide notice and a hearing as
stipulated in the 1947 Constitution. 8" The Saikosai concurred and
found that Article 118(1) violated Articles 29 and 31 of the 1947
Constitution. 18 6
The judiciary did not use judicial review to invalidate a statute again
until 1973 in the Naganuma Nike case. 8 7 In Naganuma Nike, a dis-
trict court held that Article 9188 of the 1947 Constitution prohibited the
establishment of the Japanese Self Defense Force because it was an
army with war-making potential. 189 Since 1976, however, no court has
used judicial review to declare any statute or other official act
unconstitutional.
2. Recent Trends in Judicial Review
The Japanese judiciary has received much criticism for its reluctance
to exercise judicial review. The Japanese Court invalidated only five
statutes in its first thirty years. 190 By comparison, however, the United
States Supreme Court invalidated congressional acts only twice in its
first sixty-eight years.19' Also, beginning in the early 1970s, Japanese
courts changed their attitude towards the use of judicial review.
184. See The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court, supra note 178, at
960 (describing art. 118(i) of the Customs Law).
185. The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court, supra note 178, at 960.
186. 1947 KENPo art. 29. Article 29 declares that the right to own or hold property
is safe from violation. Id. Article 31 states that no person shall be deprived of life
except according to legal procedures. Id. art. 31.
187. Naganuma Nike v. Japan, 298 Hanta 40 (Chisai, Dist. Ct., 1973).
188. See 1947 KENPO art. 9.2 (containing Japan's constitutional pledge not to
maintain an army, navy, air force, or other war potential).
189. See William R. Slomanson, Judicial Review of War Renunciation in the
Naganuma Nike Case: Juggling the Constitutional Crisis in Japan, 9 CORNELL l.,r'L
L.J. 24, 24 (1975) (discussing the facts of the Naganuma case).
190. Sakagami v. Japan, 7 Keishu 1562 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1953); Nakamura v.
Japan, 16 Keishu 1593 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1962); Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Keishu 265
(Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1973); K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, 665
Saibanshu 1, (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1975); Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Com-
mission, 30 Minshu 223 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1976).
191. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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For example, Aizawa v. Japan,"9 2 decided in 1973, questioned the
constitutionality of Penal Code Article 200,1'3 which mandated a more
severe penalty for murder of a family member than for an otherwise
ordinary homicide. Although a similar statute9 was upheld in 1950,195
Aizawa declared Article 200 unconstitutional because it violated the
1947 Constitution's equal protection clause. 196 Both the 1950 and the
1973 cases involved a clear conflict between traditional moral princi-
ples, such as devotion to the family, and universal values, such as equal
protection. With only one dissenting vote, the 1950 Court upheld a sim-
ilar provision because of the strong social and moral issues involved.19 7
In contrast, the 1973 Court voted fourteen to one to overturn the pen-
alty provision, and six of the justices argued that any difference in pen-
alty based on family ties violated the Constitution.'98 This clearly re-
flected the Court's changing attitude.
Similarly, in K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefec-
ture,199 the Saikosai declared unconstitutional a statutory provision
which prevented new pharmacies from opening within one hundred me-
ters of existing pharmacies.10 The Saikosai applied a balancing test
and ruled that adequate licensing and inspection controls existed to
protect the public from contaminated drugs, and that any additional
protection that might have resulted from geographical restrictions on
location did not outweigh limiting the constitutional right to pursue any
occupation.'' Sumiyoshi is important for three reasons: (1) it was the
first time a prior Saikosai constitutional decision had been overruled;
(2) it was the first occasion on which economic legislation had been
struck down; (3) it was the first time that a statute's unconstitutionality
192. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Keishu 265 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1973); see also John
Owen Haley, The Freedom to Choose an Occupation and the Constitutional Limits of
Legislative Discretion, 8 L. IN JAPAN 188, 188 n.1 (1975) [hereinafter The Freedom to
Choose] (discussing the Aizawa case).
193. KEIHO (Penal Code) OF 1947, Law No. 200.
194. KEIHO (Penal Code) OF 1947, Law No. 205.
195. Japan v. Yamato, 4 Keishu 2126 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1950); see also John
Owen Haley, Recent Developments, 6 L. IN JAPAN 173, 173-74 (1973) [hereinafter
Recent Developments] (dicussing the Aizawa and Yamato decisions).
196. 1947 KENPO, supra note 162, art. 14.
197. See Recent Developments, supra note 195, at 174 (comparing the Aizawa and
Yamato decisions).
198. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Keishu 265 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1973).





had a prospective impact because other licensing statutes" 2 contained
similar geographical restrictions.
In Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, the
Saikosai declared unconstitutional a statute involving an apportion-
ment plan for the Diet's lower house.20 3 Despite a large post-war shift
in population from rural to urban areas, the Diet reapportioned its
lower house only twice, in 1964 and 1975.210 Consequently, the rural
districts possessed more relative voting power than the urban dis-
tricts.20 5 Despite this inequality, the Saikosai, in the 1964 case of
Ishiyama v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Commission, rejected a claim
of unconstitutionality of a particular apportionment scheme. 200 In that
case, the Saikosai determined that the disparity in voting power did
not reach the point where it was a constitutional problem. 207 Yet, only
eight years later, the Kurokawa court held that the apportionment plan
at issue violated not only the equal protection clause, but also the con-
stitutional guarantees regarding universal suffrage and nondiscrimina-
tory treatment of political candidates. 208 The Kurokawa decision is
noteworthy because it represents an aggressive exercise of judicial re-
view; the Court will pressure the Diet and if it does not respond, the
Saikosai may take action itself.
3. Changes in the Judiciary
Several factors have contributed to a more active judiciary. The
composition of the judiciary has changed; older judges who trained and
served for a time under the Meiji Constitution slowly have been re-
placed by younger individuals who are more inclined to embrace liberal
ideologies and institutions .20  Additionally, the judiciary has gained
202. See, e.g., Shimizu v. Japan, 9 Keishu 89 (Saikosai, Sup. Ct., 1955) (upholding
a law requiring people to obtain licenses before operating a public bath). See also The
Freedom to Choose, supra note 192, at 191 (discussing the Shimizu case).




206. Ishiyama v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Comm'n, 18 Minshu 270 (Saikosai.
Sup. Ct., 1964). The claimants' position was that the apportionment scheme in ques-
tion violated the 1947 Constitution's equal protection clause. Id.
207. Id.
208. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm'n, 30 Minshu 223 (Saikosai,
Sup. Ct., Apr. 14, 1976).
209. See The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court, supra note 178, at
963-65 (noting that in the mid-1960's, a younger and more progressive group of judges
began to emerge in the lower judiciary). About 200 of these younger judges belonged
to the liberal Young Jurists Association. Id. at 964.
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prestige as an institution. Prior to World War II, the judiciary was
under the control of the Minister of Justice and was considered to be at
the bottom of the bureaucratic hierarchy.21 0 Today, judges are viewed
as full-fledged government officials.21" ' Also, the Saikosai's power of ju-
dicial appointment has contributed significantly to the increased activ-
ity of the Court.2"2 Under the 1947 Constitution, the Cabinet is re-
quired to appoint judges from a list of nominees developed by the
Saikosai and subject to the Prime Minister's veto.21 3 In the early
1970s, several individuals endorsed by the Court prevailed over the ob-
jections of the Prime Minister.214 In addition to these factors, the in-
creased judicial activity is also attributed to the presence of more pro-
fessional and well trained judges on the Court.215
C. THE CONTINUING ROLE OF CONCILIATION
Adjudication of disputes is still suspect in modern Japan for various
reasons. First, because many Japanese still consider court appearances
shameful, conciliation remains the preferred method of non-corporate
dispute resolution.216 In fact, a person who does not observe the giri-
ninjo (rules of behavior), but instead advances his own interests
through the courts, heaps scorn upon himself and his family.2 17 Second,
social status also plays a substantial role in determining whether to use
the courts for dispute resolution;218 those individuals whom Japanese
society perceives as inferior within the class structure defer to those
210. See The People and the Court in Japan, supra note 145, at 47-48 (describing
the low status of Pre-World War II judges who were not trained and were also slowly
promoted, resulting in the most able judges accepting administrative jobs in the Justice
Ministry).
211. See The People and the Court in Japan, supra note 145, at 47 (describing
pre-war Japanese judges as "step-children of the bureaucracy" due to their low prestige
and visibility).
212. See The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court, supra note 178, at
962 (discussing the Court's power over judicial appointments).
213. 1947 KENPO art. 80.
214. See The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court, supra note 178, at
962-63 (stating that the Saikosai also influences the Cabinet with respect to the ap-
pointment of new Saikosai members).
215. See Minoru Shikita, Law Under the Rising Sun, 20 JUDGES' J. 42, 45-46
(1981) (detailing the training of Japanese judges).
216. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 458 (explaining that apart from
large organizations, one does not assert one's rights through use of the courts).
217. Id.
218. See Kahei Rokumoto, Problems and Methodology of Study of Civil Disputes,




whom society perceives as superior.21 '9 Finally, the Western concept of
individual rights conflicts with Confucian ideal of a natural human hi-
erarchy, a powerful part of Japanese life.220
Examples of the continued influence of Confucian values abound in
modern-day Japan. Creditors request, not demand, that debtors meet
their obligations.221 As in earlier times, when one party apologizes, the
other forgives. To many Japanese, the disharmony created by suing an-
other person is similar to extortion, 2 and thus Japanese courts spend a
great deal of their time settling disputes through conciliation. 3
The Civil Conciliation Law (CCL),22' enacted in 1951, formally in-
troduced conciliation into the post-war Japanese civil code. The CCL
provides a mechanism for resolving disputes concerning all civil mat-
ters225 except domestic relations, which has its own conciliation law, 226
and labor disputes. It further confers on any of the 570 summary
courts, known as Kansai, jurisdiction over conciliation cases unless the
parties designate a district court. 227 A party may request that a concili-
ation case be convened by filing a proposal and paying a small fee,2 8 or
the court may so designate a case before it.229 A court generally man-
ages a conciliation case with the help of a chotei, a conciliation com-
mittee, although the judge is permitted to manage the case alone.230
The committee hears the case over a long period, often continuing for
months. The parties may be accompanied by attorneys.2 3' Most hear-
ings begin with the chairman, usually a judge, introducing those assem-
219. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 453 (describing the giri as the
"instructions" of superiors to inferiors).
220. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 458 (describing the conflict be-
tween Japanese tradition and Western legal concepts).
221. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 458 (stating that although the law
allows it, few Japanese will use the courts to resolve interpersonal conflicts).
222. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 458 (explaining that many Japanese
consider enforcing a legally acceptable claim the equivalent of extortion).
223. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 458 (stating that the Japanese find
it distasteful to allow emotions to interfere with reason, thus prefering conciliation).
224. MINPO (Civil Code), Law No. 222 of 1951, [MINPO No. 222]. translated in 2
Daniel Fenno Henderson, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MOD-
ERN 305 (1965).
225. Id. art. 2.
226. See SHOICHI ICHIKAWA, GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LAW FOR SETTuNG FAM-
ILY AFFAIRS 55 (1954) (discussing conciliation law for domestic relations).
227. MINPO No. 222 art. 3. The case is initially heard at the Kansai with jurisdic-
tion over the domicile, residence, place of work, or office of the defendant. Id.
228. Id. art. 10. The fee can not be greater than 100 yen for each 10,000 yen
representing the amount in controversy. Id. art. 10, § 2.
229. Id. art. 20.
230. Id. art. 5, § 1. A judge may not, however, manage a case alone when the
parties involved request a committee format. Id. art. 5, § 2.
231. Saiko Saibanshoi (Supreme Court) of Japan, Supreme Court Rules, Rule 8.
1992]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
bled and explaining the spirit and purpose of chotei proceedings, em-
phasizing the difference between chotei and a standard lawsuit. 32 The
judge asks that conciliators act in a fair and unbiased manner and
stresses the confidential nature of the proceedings.23 3 After the intro-
duction, the chairman and the committee members question each
party, dismiss them, and decide what action to take.2 34 The committee
devises appropriate settlements with, preferably, several alternatives.235
Subsequent hearings persuade the parties to make concessions and
reach a mutually agreeable solution. 2 6 After an agreement is reached,
the parties commit the settlement to writing which becomes binding
and judicially enforceable.2 37 Should chotei fail, the parties have two
weeks to file a lawsuit.2 8
The Japanese government strongly encourages conciliation and sup-
ports the education and training of conciliators 39 Although concilia-
tors receive only nominal fees,240 many people are anxious to serve in
these prestigious positions. Conciliators have guidelines for hearings
and are encouraged to avoid becoming angry, favoring one side, or not
transmitting even the unreasonable views of a party.
241
While the courts in Japan are busy with standard lawsuits, the judi-
ciary's primary function, according to the CCL is to encourage concili-
ation.242 The CCL, however, is not the only impetus causing the judici-
ary to gravitate towards conciliation. Many Japanese judges,
particularly the older ones, harbor Confucian values and view them-
selves as advocates of harmony and compromise.243 Although concilia-
232. Id. Rule 12.
233. Id.
234. Id. Rule 18.
235. Id. Rule 12.
236. Id. Rule 18.
237. MINPo No. 222, art. 16.
238. Id. art. 19.
239. See SOKICHI TSUDA, THE NATURE OF CONCILIATION 6 (1953) (explaining
that the government sponsors conciliators' associations to encourage participation).
240. MINPO No. 222, art. 9.
241. Id.
242. See Kawashima supra note 131, at 55, 69 (table 12) (detailing the 1957-59
figures for conciliation cases). During those three years, the Chisai and Kansai, com-
bined, received approximately 15,000 leasehold-related lawsuits. Id. at 69 (table 12).
During those same three years, 24,000 leasehold-related disputes were conciliated an-
nually. Id.
243. See The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court, supra note 178, at




tion is the preferred method of dispute resolution, compromise is advo-
cated even in standard lawsuits.24'
Even so, critics maintain that the apparent lack of litigiousness is the
result of institutional constraints rather than any overwhelming obei-
sance to Confucian preferences for conciliation. For example, Yukio
Yanagida insists that "[t]he idea that Japanese people do not pursue
their self-interest in the courts because of a cultural preference for har-
mony does not make sense to anyone who knows many Japanese." 245
Such critics point to long delays that face litigants, 2416 generally forcing
them to seek recourse from alternative mechanisms 24 7 such as insur-
ance company claim centers, consumer centers, and direct negotiations
with defendant-companies. 248 The delays in formal legal proceedings
stem largely from a dearth of litigators, known as bengoshi, and
judges.249 There are 14,000 bengoshi in Japan - 11.5 for every
100,000 people.2 50 The government is responsible for their numbers. It
controls the bar exam which law graduates must pass to enter the Le-
gal Training and Research Institute, the state-run bengoshi training
school.25' Only 600 are allowed to pass each year out of the more than
23,000 applicants.252 Typically, 400 of those who pass become bengoshi
while the remainder become public prosecutors or judges.253 In addition
to the lengthy delays faced by litigants, exorbitant retainer and court
filing fees, which all must be paid in advance, contribute to the reliance
on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 25' Critics thus maintain
244. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 24, at 458 (asserting that the judiciary's
most important function is conciliation and not adjudication).
245. Litigation in Japan, at 14, in On Trial: A Survey of The Legal Professsion,
THE ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 52 [hereinafter Survey of the Legal Profession].
246. Susan Chira, Litigants in Japanese Courts Encounter Lengthy Delays, CHIC.
DAILY L. BULL. Sept. 2, 1987, at 1.
247. See generally David Przeracki, "Working it Out" a Japanese Alternative to
Fighting It Out, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 149, 163-66 (1989) (discussing the role of
"reconciliation" versus "conciliation" in contemporary Japanese society).
248. Survey of the Legal Profession, supra note 245, at 14.
249. Christopher Grassi, How to Count Japan's Lawyers, LEGAL Tivts, April 8,
1992, at 22; Pete Landers, Japan's Few "Real" Lawyers Just Bit Players, L.A. DAILY
J., July 30, 1991, at B1.
250. Survey of the Legal Profession, supra note 245, at 13.
251. Survey of the Legal Profession, supra note 245, at 13.
252. Survey of the Legal Profession, supra note 245, at 13.
253. See Percy Luney, The Judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the Parlia-
mentary System, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 152 (1990) (stating that court dock-
ets in Japan are overcrowded because of the low number of judges that are available to
hear cases).
254. See Survey of the Legal Profession, supra note 245, at 13 (suggesting that
the Japanese people often resort to insurance programs or special compensation funds
in an effort to avoid the much more costly and time consuming demands of litigation):
see also Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & Samuel Cohen, Understanding the Incidence of
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that were the number of those allowed to pass the bar exam increased,
there would be a concomitant rise in litigation.255 Bowing to some pres-
sure, the Ministry of Justice agreed to increase to 700 the number of
those allowed to pass in 1993 but reformers charge that 2000 would be
a better figure.25
While the current resort to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
may indeed be the result of an artifically low number of judges and
lawyers, insistence that the Japanese do not favor conciliation is flawed.
The fact that the government refuses to enact far-reaching legal re-
forms is, itself, strong evidence of an overwhelming official preference
for conciliation over litigation. This may be the product of the close
relationship between government and industry in Japan. Clearly, pow-
erful segments of Japanese society still favor conciliation, although the
day may come when this current position gives way to growing
litigiousness.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the many changes occurring in the Japanese judiciary, tradi-
tional attitudes and values remain influential. Popular disapproval,
shame on the part of the victim, and an emphasis on apology continue
to be factors discouraging litigation. Although litigation is increasing in
Japan, the number of cases litigated remains relatively low.2 57 Most
disputes do not reach the courts. Those that do are often settled in a
traditional manner under the judge's guidance. Western law has fur-
nished the framework for Japanese law, but has not substantially un-
dercut the traditional values of harmony and conciliation. Yet, there
are signs that such enduring values may lose their allure. Having ex-
perienced the radical transformation of their society, the Japanese may
be on the verge of casting tradition aside and plunging headlong into
the stormy seas of litigiousness and judicial review.
Litigation in Japan: A Structural Analysis, 25 INT'L LAW. 443, 447-49 (1991) (noting
that contingency arrangements, which allow lower-income plaintiffs to pursue claims,
are generally avoided in Japan in favor of often prohibitively exorbitant retainer fees).
255. Survey of the Legal Profession, supra note 245, at 15.
256. Survey of the Legal Profession, supra note 245, at 15.
257. Japanese Aversion to Filing Lawsuits is Declining, CHIC. DAILY L. BULL.,
Aug. 29, 1985, at 1; see also Donald L. Uchtmann et al., The Developing Japanese
Legal System: Growth and Change in the Modern Era, 23 GONZ. L. REv. 349, 356-59
(1988) (noting that the restrictive admissions policy of the Legal Training and Re-
search Institute will continue to depress the volume of Japanese litigation, but at the
cost of limiting an individual's access to the courts); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru
Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18
J. LEG. STUD. 263, 267 (1989) (stating that fewer cases per capita are litigated in
Japan that in most common-law countries).
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